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1 Introduction
CL in the broader sense includes CL (in the stricter sense) and government use.
However, for conceptual clarity, this chapter treats CL and government use sepa-
rately. CL is different from government use in that its grantee is a non-government
entity, while the grantee in government use is a government or entities working for
the government.
Modelled after Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention, without however men-
tioning the term “to prevent the abuses” of patent rights, the Taiwanese Patent Act
foresaw from its inception in 1944 CL and government use. The provisions on
compulsory licensing have been amended several times, moving away from the
Paris Convention, while provisions on government use were revised once, only to
narrow its scope. Overall speaking, the regime on compulsory licensing and
government use is in regress and fails to fulfil its function of balancing public and
private interests.1
In addition to the Patent Act, the Fair Trade Act can, at least also be applied in
order to result in CL. This chapter will first discuss in theory, the Patent Act then the
Fair Trade Act (Sects. 2 and 3) in Taiwan. This chapter would not be complete
without mentioning the latest provision on compulsory licencing for pharmaceuti-
cals to export, therefore the concluding remarks are reserved for that purpose
(Sect. 4).
2 The Patent Act
2.1 Compulsory Licence
Two CL have been granted thus far in Taiwan. Both were put into practice, yet the
second one was later annulled by the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO).
2.1.1 Half a Century of Good Old Days: 1944–1994
The Law in Books
The 1944–1994 Patent Act clearly saw patent not as an end in itself but rather as an
instrument for the satisfaction of domestic needs and the incremental nature of
technological improvement that is usually based on prior inventions.
1 About the general need for and legitimacy of compulsory licensing, see Liu (2012), pp. 679–699.
About the economic merits of compulsory licensing, see Antonelli (2013), pp. 157–174.
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It was provided in Article 9 that a later invention that was based on a prior
invention could still apply for invention patent or utility model patent (dependent
patent). However, the dependent patentee shall provide the first patentee with
appropriate monetary compensation or an offer of joint production, which the
first patentee shall not refuse without justifiable reason. This was in fact an implicit
CL provision.
Article 67 stipulated that not or insufficient working of a patent can lead to its
rescission or compulsory licensing: The Patent Office can rescind the patent ex
officio or issue CL upon application of interested parties when the patentee has not
worked or not appropriately worked the patent 3 years after the patent grant without
justifiable reasons. The Patent Office shall notify the patentee before deciding. The
grantee of the CL shall provide the patentee with monetary compensation, which in
case of dispute shall be decided by the Patent Office.2
Article 68 defined what would constitute “not appropriately working the patent”:
1. The patented product has not been produced in large scale without sufficient
reason while it is possible to use the product in the country; 2. The patentee
produces the patented products entirely or for the most part in foreign countries
and imports them into domestic market; 3. The patentee of an dependent invention
fails to reach a voluntary licensing agreement under reasonable terms and condi-
tions with the first patentee upon whose patent the dependent patent was based;
4. Parts have been imported and are only to be assembled domestically. In addition,
where a patented product, which would fill an important need in the country, has not
been sufficiently supplied despite being appropriately worked, the Patent Office
may order the patentee to expand his supply within designated time limit (Article
70). If, however, the expansion fails to lead to sufficient supply, a further case of
“not appropriately working the patent” will be constituted, which would result in a
CL.3
Article 69 obliged the grantee to work the patent at issue appropriately:
where the grantee of the CL according to Article 67 fails to work the patent
appropriately, the Patent Office may rescind the compulsory licence upon applica-
tion or ex officio.
The Practice: The Nippon Soda Topsin Case
There had been only one case in which a CL was issued by the Central Bureau of
Standards (CBS, predecessor of the TIPO) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs
(MOEA) during 1944–1994. It took almost 7 years of legal back and forth before
2 The CL regime seemed only natural to the most authoritative commentator of that time, Yu-Fong
Nin (who also served as head of the Patent Office). In his well-known thesis, Industrial Property
Rights Law (in Chinese, 1st ed. 1972, p. 202 and again 3rd ed. 1982, p. 202), he just recited Article
67 without elaborating on it.
3 Chen (1995), pp. 186–187.
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the CL was finally confirmed. Presumably, the CBS was not familiar with the raison
dˇeˆtre of compulsory licence, and the patentee and the Japanese government had
exerted much pressure on the CBS and the MOEA.
On 23 July 1976, a local company filed with the CBS an application for CL
against a Japanese company (Nippon Soda Co. Ltd.) to work its method patent and
to produce patented products (a farm chemical called “Topsin”, patent number
5644). After more than 1 year, on 14 February 1978, the CBS issued a CL on the
following grounds: while it is possible to use the patented product domestically, the
patentee made no large-scale manufacture, importing only a small quantity for test
sales purposes. According to the manufacturing plans of the applicant and the
alleged licensee (a local company), the manufacturing technology required is rather
simple, the facilities needed very limited, and the investment needed to produce the
patented products small. By the time the patentee signed the draft licensing
agreement (25 October in 1974) with the licensee, 3 years had elapsed since the
patent grant, and the draft agreement was not yet formalized. In addition, the
manufacturing plan proposed by the applicant was concrete and feasible, and its
manufacturing method identical to the one contained in the patent descriptions.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, the CBS concluded that the patentee
had not worked the patent 3 years after the patent grant without justifiable reasons.
The CBS issued a CL without specifying its duration and ordered that the patentee
be rewarded with compensation to be negotiated by the parties and that it be notified
of the agreement reached.4
In the application for the CL, the applicant mentioned that a post note of NT$60
was included in the application. But no record can be found in the archive of the
CBS on whether the parties had reached consensus on the compensation and how
much it was.
On appeal, the case was annulled by the MOEA on the ground that the issued
compulsory licence was limited to the use of claims 1 and 2 and did not include the
use of claims 20–23 of the patent, which were necessary for producing the patented
products; as such, the CL was obviously inappropriate.5 The case was remanded
back to the CBS, which simply confirmed on 25 February 1980 that the licence lost
its validity with immediate effect.6 The applicant appealed the decision to the
MOEA, which was of the opinion that the CBS should substantially review the
case rather than just reiterating the decision the MOEA made on 13 April 1979.7
Upon the second remand, the CBS again granted a CL to use the patent, however
including claims 1 and 2 and 20–23.8 After being rejected by the MOEA9 and the
4CBS (66) Tai Zhuan Cheng Er Tze 65589 (14 February 1978).
5MOEA (68) Gi 11239 (13 April 1979).
6 CBS (69) Tai Zhuan Cheng Yi Tze 104993 (25 February 1980).
7MOEA (70) Su 14582 (17 April 1981).
8 CBS (70) Tai Zhuan Cheng Yi Tze 126940 (6 November 1981).
9MOEA (71) Su 18908 (2 June 1982).
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Executive Yuan,10 the patentee brought appeal to the Supreme Administrative
Court, which concurred with the CBS. The court’s decision focused exclusively
on confirming that the patentee had “not appropriately worked the patent”11: by the
time the patentee signed the “enforcement contract (formal contract)” with the
licensee, 6 years had elapsed since the patent grant; the 300 kg of “Topsin-M”
produced by the plaintiff were “elementary body” and not “product” and therefore
did not suffice to be the actual result of working of the patent; the statistics from the
Taiwanese Farm-chemicals Association provided by the plaintiff were about the
product made domestically and not the product made by the licensee; and the
product for test sales was imported from Japan.
2.1.2 The Beginning of Regress: 1994–2012
Based on the misinterpretation of the draft Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement
as allowing only three substantive grounds for compulsory licence,12 namely
national emergency, non-profit use for public interest, and failure of the applicant
to reach voluntary licensing agreement with the patentee under reasonable com-
mercial terms within a considerable period of time, in 1994 the TIPO proposed to
delete the general clause for CL against not or insufficient working of patent13 and
recognize only four specific grounds for compulsory licensing: (1) national emer-
gencies, (2) not-for-profit use of a patent for the enhancement of public welfare,
(3) failure to reach a voluntary licensing agreement with the patentee, (4) remedy
against anti-competitive conduct (Article 67 renumbered as Article 78 and as
Article 76 in 2003). In addition, a mandatory cross-licensing mechanism was also
envisioned to cure the failure of a dependent patentee whose invention was based
on the invention of others to reach a voluntary licensing agreement with such other
patentees, as well as to cure the failure of a method patentee whose products made
with the said method are covered by the product patent to reach a voluntary
licensing agreement with such product patentee (Article 80, renumbered as Article
78 in 200314). The proposal was accepted entirely by the Legislative Yuan and
became law in 1994.
10 The Executive Yuan Tai (71) SuTze 17491 (18 October 1982).
11 The Supreme Administrative Court 1983 Pan-Tze 359 Decision (decided on 7 April 1983).
12 Document of the Legislative Yuan of 1 January 1994, Second Congress, First Session, 48th
Meeting. It has been widely accepted by the international IP community that Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement imposes only a stringent procedural requirement but leaves Members leeway in
deciding the grounds for issuing CL. For more details, see the chapter “The Use of Compulsory
Licences in Latin America” by Carlos M. Correa, in this volume.
13 However, some commentators lauded the provision as more “up to date”. See Chen
(1997), p. 109.
14 In 1997, an additional requirement was inserted into this Article: “the dependent invention or the
method patent must ‘involve an important technical advancement of considerable economic
significance in relation to the prior invention or product patent’”.
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Only two applications had been filed between 1994 and 2012. While the first led
to the grant of a CL by the TIPO against Philips (“Philips CD-R case”) to remedy
failure to reach a voluntary licensing agreement with Philips,15 the second was later
withdrawn by the applicant.16
The Philips CD-R Case
Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden have pooled their patents on CD-R together and
jointly licensed the pooled patents through a Joint Licensing Agreement (JLA)17 in
1992 with one royalty formula: 3 % of the net sales price and not lower than ¥10
(Japanese Yen). Philips was designated as the sole contact for licensing the pooled
patents. The market price of a CD-R disc at the time the JLA was entered into was
approximately ¥300, making 3 % of which almost identical with ¥10. However, the
market price of CD-Rs in the meanwhile dropped drastically and made the price
floor of ¥10 unbearable. In July 2002, GigaStorage, a Taiwanese CD-R manufac-
turer and once a licensee of CD-R patents held by Philips, filed with TIPO an
application for compulsory licence of the five patents owned by Philips after
fruitless negotiation with Philips to reduce the royalty to reflect the falling prices
of CD-Rs.
A. The TIPO Granted Compulsory Licence Against Philips
The TIPO came to a decision 2 years later (in 2004) and permitted the applicant the
use of Philips’s five patents primarily to satisfy the needs of domestic market to the
dates when they expired (ranging from 26 January 2007 to 19 December 2009).18
The TIPO did not touch upon the sensitive issue of appropriate compensation since
the object of the application for compulsory licence was limited to the granting of
such and did not involve the calculation of compensation. However, no agreement
on the calculation of compensation has ever been reached between the two parties.
The case was appealed to the Taipei Administrative High Court in August 2006.
B. The TIPO Annulled the Granted Compulsory Licence
GigaStorage and Philips filed separately with the TIPO applications to annul the
compulsory patent licence on 23 April and 5 May 2006. Among other reasons,
15 For more details, see Liu (2011), pp. 83–104.
16 The unsuccessful fate of the CL against Philips might have played a role in the withdrawal of the
application because the applicant was also a local CD-R manufacturer.
17 The JLA was declared a cartel agreement among competitors and banned by the Taiwanese Fair
Trade Commission (TFTC). Accordingly, Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden started to license their
own patents separately despite the later Supreme Administrative Court decision that rejected the
determination by the TFTC. For more details, see Liu (2011), pp. 86–87.
18 For more details, see Liu (2011), p. 88.
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GigaStorage’s main consideration was that it would cease to manufacture CD-Rs in
Taiwan on 31 May 2007 and no longer need the CL. Philips’s application was based
on the ground that the licensee exceeded the limit of “primarily for domestic
market” by exporting more than 50 % of its production made under the CL. Philips
went further to demand that the licence be retroactively annulled, hoping to
eradicate any precedential effect of the TIPO’s decision.
On 31 May 2007, the TIPO annulled the CL with immediate rather than
retroactive effect as requested by Philips. Its reasoning was twofold: GigaStorage
no longer needed the use of the patents and no other public interest was at stake, and
evidence provided by Philips could not directly prove that GigaStorage exported
more than 50 % of its production made under the CL.19
C. The Taipei Administrative High Court Rescinded the TIPO’s Decision to Grant
Compulsory Licence
Regardless of the fact that the TIPO annulled the CL with immediate effect on
31 May 2007 and that the compulsory licence was granted only to GigaStorage, the
Taipei Administrative High Court rescinded the decisions of the TIPO on 13 March
2008, but only on the ground that the TIPO failed to take into consideration factors
other than the way royalty is calculated when determining “the reasonable com-
mercial terms”. Given the fact that GigaStorage and Philips entered into a settle-
ment agreement on 29 October 2007,20 the TIPO decided not to appeal the decision,
which made the case final.
2.1.3 Race to the Bottom: 2013 Patent Act
Under the TIPO’s initiative,21 the Patent Act was revised on 29 November 2011 by
the Legislative Yuan to limit the TIPO’s power to grant CL. The amendment took
effect on 1 January 2013. The new provision largely closes down the possibility of
granting CL upon application to three narrowly defined situations: (1) -
non-commercial exploitation for enhancement of public interest, (2) exploitation
of dependent patents, (3) commission by a patentee of acts restricting competition
or unfair competition acts determined by a court or by the Taiwanese Fair Trade
Commission (TFTC).
19 The TIPO Tzefatze No. 09618600360 (31 May 2007).
20 For more details, see Liu (2011), p. 89.
21 The European Union reacted strongly to the TIPO’s decision to grant compulsory licence
against Philips and demanded that Taiwan revise provisions on compulsory licence and “ensure
that precedential effects of the measures are eliminated, including ensuring that the compulsory
licenses are revoked in their entirety” within 2 months from the transmission of the report to the
TIPO. Under such threat, the TIPO undertook to revise the Patent Act.
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Article 87(2) prescribes grounds for compulsory licensing:
1. Under any of the following circumstances, for which compulsory patent licensing is
necessary, the Specific Patent Agency may, upon request, grant compulsory licensing of a
patent: (1) where the patented invention is exploited non-for-profit for the enhancement of
public interest; (2) where a later invention or utility model patent cannot be exploited
without infringing a prior invention or utility model patent, and where the later invention or
utility model patent involves an important technical advancement of considerable eco-
nomic significance in relation to the prior invention or utility model patent;(3) where a
patentee has be found committing acts restricting competition or unfair competition acts by
a court or by the TFTC.22
Application for CL of a patent covering semiconductor technology shall be filed
based on the grounds set forth in Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the preceding Paragraph
(Article 87(3)). Application for CL of a patent in accordance with Subparagraphs
1 through 2 of Paragraph 2 may only be permitted if the requestor for CL has made
efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time (Article 87(4)). In response to a request for compulsory licensing of a
patent in accordance with Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 2, the owner of the prior
patent may propose reasonable terms and conditions and seek the grant of CL of the
later patent owned by the requestor (Article 87(5)). Article 88 prescribes the
procedure, scope, duration, etc. of a CL. Article 89 deals with the termination of
a CL.
2.2 Government Use
2.2.1 1944–1994: Limitation or Expropriation of Patents
for the Military or State-Run Businesses
The Patent Act did not contain a general government use clause but mentioned two
specific kinds of government use. Article 72 stipulated that the government may
limit or expropriate patents entirely or partially for military purposes or to meet the
needs of state-run enterprises, provided that the patentees have been compensated
with money. No record or literature shows that this Article had ever been put to use
prior to its deletion in 1994.
22 Theoretically, any violation of the Fair Trade Act, which is composed of antitrust and unfair
competition law, would suffice. However, violation of the unfair competition provision alone
would hardly justify the grant of a compulsory licence.
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2.2.2 1994–2012: Further Narrowing Down Government Use
to National Emergency
Replacing Expropriation with Compulsory Licence
The reason for the deletion of Article 72 of the Patent Act was that “the grounds for
CL will be limited by this amendment to national emergency, public-interest-
enhancing non-profit use and failure to reach licensing agreement under reasonable
commercial terms within a reasonable period. In case of national emergency, a
much more serious scenario than the military use and with stricter requirements,
only compulsory license of patents can be applied for, whereas expropriation of
patents can be applied to military use. This seems to be out of balance. As for the
expropriation of patents to meet the needs of state-run enterprises, it runs counter to
the established policy of privatisation of state-run enterprises. To avoid undue
involvement of the public sector in private economic activities, such provision is
therefore deleted”. The deletion has not aroused much debate even though it is very
dubious whether compulsory licensing for national emergency and government use
for the military are comparable at all and it is not clear which scenario can be said to
be more serious than the other.
The Practice: The Tamiflu Case
On 31 October 2005, the Department of Health (DOH) filed with the TIPO an
application for a CL to use a patented drug owned by Gilead Sciences, Inc., USA
and exclusively licensed to F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, Switzerland. The applica-
tion was motivated by the fear that an epidemic of avian flu might break out in
Taiwan. In less than 2 months, the TIPO approved conditionally the application for
manufacturing such patented capsules until 31 December 2007. Thanks to the fact
that the feared epidemic did not break out, the CL was not implemented.23
2.2.3 The 2013 Patent Act
The 2013 Patent Act’s revision of government use was mainly driven by the need of
government authorities to respond to national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency immediately without having to file an application for compulsory
licence and for the sake of “clearly delineating the division of competence and
responsibility between offices” (cited from the legislative reasons). There has not
been much parliamentary debate on this revision. According to Article 87 (1), in
response to national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the
TIPO shall, in accordance with an Emergency Order or upon notice from the
23 Liu (2008), p. 67.
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competent central government authorities, grant compulsory licence and notify the
patentee as soon as reasonably practicable. In other words, the TIPO no longer has
to make a decision and will just issue a compulsory licence automatically.
2.3 Assessment of the 2013 Patent Act Regime
on Compulsory Licence and Government Use
2.3.1 Compulsory Licence
By and large, the new provisions on compulsory licensing are in regress, rather than
progressing, in terms of furthering public interests, mainly because a general clause
for compulsory licence is missing (such as Article 67 of the Patent Act between
1949 and 1994), which is common in Germany,24 Japan,25 and the UK.26
The Legacy of the Philips CD-R Case
The Philips CD-R case was annulled by the TIPO on the ground that it was no
longer needed and by the Taipei Administrative High Court for not being inclusive
enough in determining reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Notwithstand-
ing, the substantive reasons of the Philips CD-R case remain unchallenged and
therefore command precedential or at least guiding effects for the interpretation of
the new patent law.
According to the Philips CD-R ruling, the standing of the applicant to file for
compulsory licence will not be affected by his/her use of the patent at issue prior to
the filing27; factors to be taken into consideration when determining the reasonable
commercial terms and conditions include the calculation methods for royalty; the
benefits to the licensor and licensee; the shared risks; the renown of the technical
brand; market demands; the scope, duration, and technology of the licence; hori-
zontal competition; conditions in the licensing market; and the clauses contained in
the licensing agreement.28 It cannot be concluded as reasonable commercial terms
and conditions when it is solely based on the calculation methods for royalty
proposed by the applicant; “reasonable period of time” shall be determined
24 See the chapter “Compulsory Licensing in Germany” by Philipp Maume, in this volume.
25Masabumi Suzuki/Yoshiyuki Tamura, chapter 5 in Liu and Hilty (2012), pp. 33–60.
26 For a detailed discussion of the patent law of the UK, see Liu (2012), p. 688.
27 Liu (2008), p. 67. Whether the alleged infringer of a patent can use CL as a defence against
infringement claim only when the TIPO actually granted such licence beforehand remains to be
clarified by courts.
28 Liu (2011), p. 89.
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according to general social conceptions and not unilaterally by the length asserted
by either the applicant or his/her opposing party.29
Depriving the Patentee of Procedural Right to Be Heard Prior to the Grant
of Compulsory Licence in Circumstances of Extreme Urgency
It is undoubtedly true that national emergency allows no time for negotiating a
voluntary licensing agreement for the needed patent. That’s why the second sentence
of Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement waives a prior negotiation requirement as
stipulated in the first sentence. However, the basic right of being heard before the
handing down of an adverse decision cannot be waived altogether in other circum-
stances of extreme urgency. In addition, the involvement of the patentee before the
competent central government authorities can substantially contribute to the correct
evaluation of the case and the outcome of such a compulsory licence.
Abandoning the TIPO’s Gatekeeper Role in National Emergency
and Circumstances of Extreme Urgency
In case of national emergency and circumstances of extreme urgency, all that is
required of the TIPO is to notify the patentee as soon as reasonably practicable. The
TIPO no longer has any role to play. Whether the requested patent is the right cure
compared to other alternative patents and whether some ancillary orders (such as
providing aid or know-how information30) are required to work the CL are entirely
left with the President or the competent central government authorities, who are
unfamiliar with the patent landscape. The TIPO should at least intervene when the
President and the competent central government authorities decide on the grant of
CL and not abandon its gatekeeper role.
Erroneously Limiting Public Interest Use to Not-for-Profit
The provision on not-for-profit use that would enhance public interest stands out for
two reasons. For one thing, it does not elaborate on the meaning or scope of public
interest,31 which provides courts with little guidance on its application. Without
clear guidance, courts in Taiwan tend to interpret public interest narrowly. For
29 Liu (2008), pp. 68–70.
30 For a detailed discussion of ancillary orders that are required to make the issued compulsory
licence work, see the chapter “Ancillary Orders of Compulsory Licensing and Their Compatibility
with the TRIPS Agreement” by Richard Li-dar Wang, in this volume.
31 According to Chen (1995), p. 186, public interest should be interpreted broadly to include at
least national defence, national health, medicines, food, and environmental protection.
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another, it limits such CL to not-for-profit use, a limitation that is in itself infeasible
in a market economy and therefore cannot be found in the much looked-up patent
law of, say, Germany and the UK.32 Not-for-profit should not be the precondition
for compulsory licence.33
Public Non-commercial Use Stricter Than TRIPS34
According to Article 87(3), the application for public non-commercial use may only
be permitted if the applicant for compulsory licence has made efforts to obtain
authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions
and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.
However, under Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, this requirement of prior
unsuccessful negotiation may be waived by a Member in cases of public
non-commercial use. In comparison, Article 87(3) is stricter than Article 31(b)
of the TRIPS Agreement and wrongfully favours patentees’ interest over public
interest.
The Immediate Determination of Remuneration Runs the Risk of Being
Premature and Incorrect
According to Article 88(3), a decision on an application for compulsory licence
shall indicate the required remuneration. The legislative reason was that “the
current two-stage approach (negotiate first, the TIPO intervenes later when dispute
arises) was time-consuming and the patentee cannot be compensated in time”.
Indeed, in Germany, the remuneration will be decided by the Federal Patent
Court when it grants CL and the payment of which is the precondition for such a
grant.35 However, in Germany, one can rather easily draw a good picture of what
constitutes reasonable compensation for a specific licensing agreement with help
from literature such as “Licensing Rates for Technical Inventions”.36
In sharp contrast, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the TIPO
to intervene and decide the reasonable remuneration in a void (without external
help) and in advance. Only the later and actual development of the market can
32 For a detailed discussion of the patent law of Germany, see Liu (2012), p. 689.
33 Patent Declaration that “In determining the scope and duration of a compulsory license states
should take into account the commercial interests of licensees. A Compulsory licensee should not
be deprived of the possibility of obtaining reasonable compensation and an adequate return on
investment. Otherwise, he or she will have no incentive to apply for a compulsory license in the
first place.” (Paragraph 32).
34 Shieh (2012), p. 49.
35Wilhelm in Fitzner/Lutz/Bodewig, PatRKomm, 4th ed., 2012, PatG § 24 Rn. 56; Benkard/
Rogge, Patentgesetz, 10th ed., 2006 § 24, Rdnr. 33.
36 For a detailed discussion, see Liu (2012), p. 696.
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better tell. One wonders why the Patent Act would not follow the wisdom of the
“Orange Book” decision by the German Supreme Court by requiring the applicant
to first pay an amount according to equitable discretion and letting the parties work
out the difference later with the assistance from the TIPO.
Unduly Excluding Design Patents from Compulsory Licensing
Article 87(2) mentions only invention patents and utility model patents as the scope
of CL and government use, and Article 142 does not apply Articles 87 and
88 mutatis mutandis to design patents. This seems to mismatch the growing
importance of design patents in an interconnected world.37 According to the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, UK, the government has power to
grant CL for both registered and unregistered designs for protection of the public
interest.38 This would be very much needed Taiwan in the foreseeable future.
2.3.2 Government Use
The Legacy of the Tamiflu Case
According to the Tamiflu case, which was not challenged by the parties or courts,
what constitutes a national emergency shall be determined by competent national
authorities alone; in case of national emergency, the patent at issue needs not be the
only or last means to cope with it, and the guarantee by the patentee that he/she will
provide the patented drug ahead of the scheduled delivery date cannot dissolve the
national emergency in time.39
37 However, some are still of the opinion that design patents are not related to public interest at all;
see Yang (2003), p. 456.
38 Section 238 provides: (1) Subsection (1A) applies where whatever needs to be remedied,
mitigated or consists of or includes—(a) conditions in licences granted by an unregistered design
right owner restricting the use of the design by the licensee or the right of the design right owner to
grant other licences, or (b) a refusal of a design right owner to grant licences on reasonable terms.
(1A) The powers (by the Secretary of State, the Competition Commission or the Office of Fair
Trading) conferred by Schedule 8 to the Enterprise Act of 2002 include power to cancel or modify
those conditions and, instead or in addition, to provide that licences in respect of the design right
shall be available as of right. (3) The terms of a licence available by virtue of this section shall, in
default of agreement, be settled by the comptroller. Section 270 provides the same powers
exercisable for protection of the public interest when it comes to registered designs: (1) The
registrar may by order cancel or modify any such condition or may, instead or in addition, make an
entry in the register to the effect that licences in respect of the design are to be available as of right.
(2) The terms of a licence available by virtue of this section shall, in default of agreement, be
settled by the registrar on an application by the person requiring the licence; and terms so settled
shall authorise the licensee to do everything which would be an infringement of the right in the
registered design in the absence of a licence.
39 Liu (2008), pp. 71–75.
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The Scope and Requirement of Government Use Too Narrow and Stringent
The 2013 Patent Act mistakenly limits government use to national emergency and
circumstances of extreme urgency, excluding other public interest concerns that
might be of lesser gravity yet equally legitimate, such as health care, environment
protection, and national defence. The Patent Act further ties national emergency
only to an Emergency Order issued by the President, which happened only once
after the lifting of Martial Law in 1987.40 What’s really worrying is that the
function and legitimacy of government use seem to have gradually faded away
from the realm of patent law under the influence of technocrats of the TIPO.
3 The Fair Trade Act
In principle, CL can also be acquired via the application of the Fair Trade Act.
However, the TFTC has not yet seen compulsory licence as one of the “necessary
corrective measures” of the Fair Trade Act, although it did find a violation of the
Fair Trade Act in the Philips CD-R case.
The FTTC found in the Philips CD-R case abuses of a joint monopolistic
position by and cartel41 among Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden and imposed NT
$8 million, NT$4 million, and NT$2 million fines, respectively, but in one admin-
istrative decision and not three. While the Taipei Administrative High Court upheld
the first finding and overruled the second, it found itself unable to render an
“affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part” decision and was compelled to rescind the
TFTC’s decision as a whole. Both the TFTC and the complainant appealed the
case to the Supreme Administrative Court, which was rejected on 4 April 2007.42
The case was remitted back to the TFTC, which came to the same conclusion
that the following exploitative abuse of monopoly power violated Article 10(2) and
(4) of the Fair Trade Act: refusing to renegotiate royalty with licensees while there
have been significant changes in the market; refusing to provide licensees with
40 In 1999, an Emergency Order was issued by the President after a magnitude 7.3 earthquake hit
Taiwan.
41 However, the Taipei Administrative High Court was of a totally different opinion and was
guided by the following facts: (1) the TFTC has determined the relevant market to be the “CD-R
technology market”; (2) what the TFTC defined as CD-R is products produced in accordance with
the standards specified in the Orange Book set up by Philips and Sony; (3) local CD-R manufac-
turers must use all the patents owned by Philips et al. in order to make CD-Rs; (4) using patents of
any one of the three companies would not be sufficient to manufacture CD-Rs; (5) therefore,
patents owned by Philips et al. were complementary in nature and every pooled patent was
indispensable, which made the patented technology no longer substitutable, and no competition
relationship could exist between Philips et al.
42 The Supreme Administrative Court Pantze 553 of 2007 (4 April 2007).
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information about the content, scope, or valid term of the licensed patents; and
commanding that licensees not challenge the validity of the licensed patents.43
In case the TFTC reaches the finding that an IP owner has abused its monopo-
listic market power by charging prohibitively high royalty, it is arguably desirable
for the TFTC to issue CL thereupon so as to avoid the delay that will ensue when the
victim of such abuse has to file with the TIPO an extra application for compulsory
licence.
4 Concluding Remarks
Taiwan has accepted the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement proposed by
the general council of the World Trade Organization on 31 July 2012. To honor that
international commitment the 2013 revision to the Patent Act introduces provisions on
Compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals to export (CLPE). Article 90 prescribes
grounds of and procedures for CLPE for assisting countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector to obtain pharmaceutical
product(s) needed in treating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics.
Article 91 deals with the export of patented pharmaceutical products made under the
compulsory licence and the remuneration for the patentees.
Although CLPE is conceptually similar to government use, it differs from the
latter in that it is the result of international human brotherhood and therefore for
the use of foreign government rather than for domestic government.
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